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Community participation in forest management has exi t d in the United Republic of Tanzania 
for a long time, but on a small scale. It is common t  find trees of certain species are being 
protected and managed for traditional reasons. It has been observed that forests and woodlands 
that are managed using traditional knowledge and practices are accorded high respect by 
concerned communities. Thus, fires or encroachment does not affect them. While the strategy of 
setting aside forests and woodlands for protection remains the centerpiece of management of 
these resources in the United Republic of Tanzania, th s has been the result of evolutionary 
process from a conventional to a participatory approach of forest management. In this regards, 
Tanzania has been considered among successful countries in African in implementing 
Participatory Forest Management (PFM) as promoted through both Community-Based Forest 
Management (CBFM) and Joint Forest Management (JFM). Policy provisions and legal 
framework has been important stepping stones for involvement of different players in forest 
conservation. In addition, legal reforms have tried to invert the colonial approach that excluded 
local communities from management and ownership of m st resources in their vicinity. PFM 
typically has been implemented on a forest-by-forest or village-by-village basis, rather than 
using a landscape approach. But protecting one forest through PFM may displace villagers’ Non 
Timber Forest Product (NTFP) harvest into other less protected forests, possibly causing greater 
ecological damage. A landscape approach to PFM would take into account even those forests 
that are not used by villagers before PFM is introduced but that might be once PFM reduces or 
eliminates access to alternative forests.   
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Approximately one third of Tanzania’s forested area is reserved in the form of Central 
Government Forest Reserves (CGFRs) under the jurisdiction of the Forestry and Beekeeping 
Division (FBD) or Local Government Forest Reserves (LGFRs) under the jurisdiction of District 
Forestry Officers (Wily & Dewees 2001). The forest resources in these reserves have been 
exposed to uncontrolled extraction activities because governments have lacked the capacity to 
properly enforce the rules governing extraction (Wily 1998). The other two thirds of the forested 
area not formally gazetted as forest reserves and are situated on areas of general or village land 
and is de facto an open access resource (Wily & Dewees 2001). Devolving management 
authority over forest resources to villages or other local communities, as in Participatory Forest 
Management (PFM), is recognised as a means to arrest deforestation or forest degradation 
occurring because of open access problems (Lindsay 1999, Matakala & Kwesinga 2001, MNRT 
1998, Petersen & Sandhövel 2001, Wily & Dewees 2001; Robinson and Lokina, 2011). This has 
also become an officially declared goal of the Government of Tanzania (GoT) in the new 
National Forest Policy of 1998 and the recently approved relatively New Forest Act of 2002 
(MNRT 1998, URT 2002). In Tanzania, villages or other local communities can obtain lease 
rights over CGFRs and LGFRs through Joint Forest Management or create their own forest 
reserves out of general or village land through Community Based Forest Management (CBFM).   
 
Therefore the specific characteristics of common prope ty resources (CPRs) will be presented 
along with alternative ways of managing CPRs with special emphasis on the collective 
management regime, the principles of which are applied in PFM. Secondly the theories on 
collective management of CPRs developed by Oakerson (1992) and Ostrom (1990; 1999) are 
presented, as these theories form a basis for the analysis of the PFM implementation. Then a 
behavioural approach to collective action by Ostrom (1998) is presented, as this lays the 
foundation for a more careful study of the mutual interaction of the actors in the PFM 
implementation process. Finally, the three theoretical approaches are synthesised and the 
application of them in relation to PFM is briefly discussed.  
 
 
2.0 Characteristics of Common Pool Resources 
For the purpose of this review paper CPRs are defined as renewable resource systems from 
which (1) extraction reduces the amount of resources available to others and (2) exclusion is very 
difficult or costly. These characteristics are denominated rivalry and excludability in economic 
terms, and in these terms CPRs are defined as showing rivalry in consumption, but only low 
degrees of excludability (Gravelle & Rees 1992, Hanley et al. 1997, Ostrom 1990). Excludability 
is concerned with the possibility of excluding others from benefiting from the good, while rivalry 
relates to whether the consumption of one person reduces the amount available to others 
(Gravelle & Rees 1992, Varian 1992). Figure 1 illustrates how the distinction between goods 
may be done according to the properties of rivalry nd excludability. 
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Imperfect excludability often occurs when effective control of a good is conferred on a group of 
individuals rather than a single individual or when a good has such physical characteristics that 
exclusion is either very difficult or very costly. Goods or assets with this characteristic are 
described variously as non-exclusive, free access, common-property resources or common pool 
resources (Gravelle & Rees 1992, Varian 1992).  
 
Forests are renewable natural resources as they are self-regenerating and continue to produce 
extractable resources if not depleted below a certain critical stock level below which their 
regenerating capacity is seriously affected33 (Neher 1990, Pearce & Turner 1990, Turner et al. 
1994; Perman et al 1999). Thus, the amount of resouces that can be extracted from forests 
without exhausting the resource is finite, implying that extraction is subject to rivalry. 
Furthermore, natural forests often suffer the consequences of imperfect excludability because 
their size and other physical attributes make exclusion very costly. This situation is especially 
valid in less developed countries (LDCs) where forests tend to be subject to poor enforcement of 
and/or confusion regarding tenure rights (Angelsen 1999, Angelsen & Kaimowitz 1999, Ostrom 
1990, Petersen & Sandhövel 2001, Tyynelä 2002). From the defining characteristics shown in 
figure 2.1 it is clear that such forests are goods or assets in the CPR category.  
 
3.0 Problems related to CPRs  
Resources with CPR characteristics are threatened by overuse when the sum of the individual 
rational users behaviour produces an outcome that is sub-optimal for all users as a group and the 
concerned parties cannot agree on how to solve the problem. This sub-optimal outcome occurs 
when (1) users perceive their individual benefits from extraction to be higher than their share of 
                                                          
33
 If a forest is depleted below its critical stock level it may suffer grass invasion or desertification, providing long-term damage 
to its productive functions (Frost 1996). 
Figure 1: Designation of goods/services 
 




the resource degradation cost that is shared among all users and (2) the costs34 of cooperating are 
higher than the perceived additional benefits (Gravelle & Rees 1992, Hanley et al. 1997, North 
1990, Pearce & Turner 1990, Pretty & Ward 2001, Turner et al. 1994, Varian 1992).   
 
When overuse results from non-exclusion the market has failed to signal the true scarcity of the 
resource (Hanley et al. 1997). In such situations every individual is incled to capture as many 
of the benefits from the CPR as possible before someone else does. Game-theoretic models as 
‘The prisoners’ dilemma’ assuming rational behaviour by agents have been used to show that 
non-cooperating users of a CPR are likely to produce a Pareto-inferior outcome as a Nash 
Equilibrium35. In the words of Ostrom (1998) these CPR problems are social dilemmas, where 
“Social dilemmas occur whenever individuals in interdependent situations face choices in which 
the maximization of short-term self-interest yields outcomes leaving all participants worse off 
than feasible alternatives” (Ostrom 1998:1). This definition by Ostrom also embraces the famous 
game-theoretic models ‘The tragedy of the commons’ a d the ‘The prisoners’ dilemma’. 
 
4.0 Solutions to CPR dilemmas 
Traditionally, solutions to CPR dilemmas have been sought primarily in neoclassical theory 
assuming that agents behave rationally and stipulatng that the market is the only means to 
ensure an efficient outcome. Within this line of thinking the solutions to CPR dilemmas are 
either policy interventions or privatization both intended to correct the market failures that 
prevent efficient resource allocation. These solutins are based on the assumption that rational 
individuals are trapped in CPR dilemmas from which they cannot extract themselves without 
external inducements or sanctions (Hardin 1968, Pretty & Ward 2001). External intervention in 
the form of a government taking over management responsibilities, however, has the 
shortcoming that government officials may lack both the knowledge to device optimal rules and 
the power to enforce these rules (Petersen & Sandhövel 2001, Pretty & Ward 2001). In situations 
where ownership is vested with authorities that are ext rnal to the user-community and have only 
few resources for enforcement, and where the rules governing appropriation are not well suited 
to local conditions, those rules are likely to be abandoned by users pursuing the strategy that 
produces the sub-optimal outcomes (Pretty & Ward 2001, Ostrom 1990; 1999). An alternative to 
external intervention is collective management by loca  communities, which has been suggested 
as a solution to CPR dilemmas (Ostrom 1990). When rational individuals behave according to 
the game-theoretic trigger-strategy it results in the optimal outcome for the community as a 
whole36. 
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In collective management of a CPR a mutual bargaining among the users of the resource must 
occur in order to achieve the Pareto-superior outcome. This implies that users comply with a 
collective strategy of restricted individual use of the resource in the interest of its long-term 
sustainable use for the community as a whole (Pearce & Turner 1990). Hence, the collective 
strategy for the management of a CPR determines who shall use it, in what circumstances, for 
what length of time and under what terms (Gravelle & Rees 1992). 
 
In the words of Ostrom (1998) users can solve first-o der social dilemmas, which are the 
dilemmas facing the users of a CPR leading to overuse, only through first solving the second-
order social dilemmas of providing the rules governing collective management and enforcement 
of these rules. Solving such second-order social dilemmas is difficult, as the people taking the 
responsibility thereby are providing a public good.  
 
The importance of the participatory forest management (PFM) process in Tanzania is underlined 
by the fact that around 90 percent of the country’s energy consumption is supplied by woodfuel. 
This makes Tanzania one of the countries (number 8 of 170 countries) in the world most 
dependent on woodfuel for energy purposes (World Bank 2002). One of the consequences of this 
dependency is that the forest resource has been depleted in many areas as a direct consequence of 
the demand for woodfuel (Hofstad 1997, Ishengoma & Ngaga 2000, Monela et al. 2000). 
Furthermore, Tanzania is one of the poorest countries in the world. On the latest Human 
Development Index (HDI) from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Tanzania is 
placed as number 152 of 185 countries in the survey (UNDP 2013). As the importance of forest 
management in relation to rural poverty alleviation has been accentuated by numerous 
researchers (Cavendish 1998; 1999; 2000, Luoga et l. 2000, Monela et al. 2000,), it seems 
obvious that PFM if appropriately implemented can play a significant role in alleviating poverty 
problem in the country. In other words, PFM potentially has a very large role to play in both the 
conservation and developmental perspective of forested areas in Tanzania.  
 
Thus, PFM in many low-income countries has been introduced to protect forests from over-
exploitation whilst ensuring those nearby forest-dependent households’ livelihoods are not 
harmed by reduced access to forest resources. Despite these however, it has remained a problem 
as in most forests, nearby communities that have in the past relied on the forests have lost access 
to important forest resources and have little incentiv  to stop more distant individuals and groups 
from degrading the forests. Forest officials have th  incentive, but lack funds and appropriate 
enforcement strategies to protect the forests. As a consequence, nearby communities has not 
extracted the maximum benefits from PFM contrary to their expectation, and worse still in some 
places their relationship with the forest officers has not improved.  
 
Decentralized forest management was introduced in Tanzania to correct poor incentives for local 
communities to protect forests and trees (URT, 1998). Under the 1959 Forest Ordinance, local 
communities had no official rights to adjacent forest resources or trees on farmland and central 
government could issue harvesting licenses without consulting or informing the affected 
communities. The resulting poor incentives for loca ommunities to protect forest and tree 




resources is thought to have played a significant role in the degradation of forest in Tanzania 
(Petersen and Sandhövel, 2001; Wily and Dewees, 2001).  
 
Over the past thirty years, a series of policies have imed to address rural people’s dependence 
on forest resources while protecting those forests from further deforestation and degradation.  
Social forestry projects, integrated conservation-development projects (ICDPs); participatory 
forest management (PFM), encompassing joint forest management (JFM) and community-based 
forest management (CBFM); ecotourism; and payment for environmental services (PES); 
Reduced Emission through deforestation and Degradation (REDD); Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), all aim to involve villagers in the protection of local forests and to enable 
villagers to capture some value from the protected forests.  Individual projects and policies have 
been deemed successful when the local communities have received benefits. However, the 
distributional effects of these projects have tended not to be addressed explicitly, and the 
connection to maintained or increased forest protecti n, or avoided degradation, particularly at a 
landscape level, has proven elusive. 
 
In mid-1990s there was an increased realization of insufficient central government’s capacity 
(both financial and human resources) to manage both reserved and non-reserved forests 
necessitated the need for a new approach that will secure local communities’ support (Dewees 
2001; Wily and Dewees 2001; Blomley and Ramadhani, 2006). This implied a decentralization 
of forest management rights to local communities through a strategy called Participatory Forest 
Management (PFM), which implies both community management as well as co-management 
approaches (Community-Based Forest Management and Joi t Forest Management). Reasons 
behind such decentralization of forest resources management include: the potential for cost-
effective local management of forests; relevance of local knowledge of ecological dynamics to 
proper management; increased motivation for local community to conserve forests following 
recognition of their critical role in the management, eventual increase in tangible benefits from 
the forest (economic incentives) and sense of ownership regained over their forest resources 
(empowerment) (See Kajembe and Kessy 2000).    
 
The transfer of forest ownership and management responsibility from central to village 
government/community started through limited number of experiments in northern and western 
Tanzania (Wily 1997). It was on the basis of the lessons learnt and challenges encountered that 
were important for improving modalities to scale up PFM activities. In order to formalize the 
decentralization of forest resource management righs, t is experimental activities went hand in 
hand with the review of policies and legislation relat d to forestry sector in the late 1990s 
(Blomley and Ramadhani 2006, URT, 2006).   
 
Important legal reforms that created enabling environment for participation of local communities 
in management of land and forest resources included; the development of the National Land 
Policy (URT, 1995), approval of National Forestry Policy (1998), formulation of the Land Act 
(1999) and Village Land Act (1999), enactment of the Forest Act (2002) and Forest Regulations 
(2004) as well as development of Participatory Forest Management Guidelines in Mainland 
Tanzania. In this paper attempt is made to review ky policies related to forest and how the 




policy has been instrumental towards the successfully implementation of the management 
approach and showing how these forest reforms confirm to the principals as stipulated by 
Ostroms and others.  
 
5.0 National Land Policy (1995) 
Land reform was an important policy issues that advocated land tenure issues by providing clear 
distinction between land that falls under the authori y of central government and that under the 
authority of village governments. The policies, among other things address the need for 
governing/secure land tenure system, land use management and administration. Such reforms 
were a need since Tanzania attained political independence in 1961. Under the land that falls in 
the village government, the village councils are charged with the role of managing the village 
communal land, including forests and woodlands within eir respective village boundaries. This 
reform was an important stage towards decentralization of land management rights through 
involvement of the local communities. 
  
6.0 National Forestry Policy (1998) 
The goal of the policy is to have “an integrated forest sector that achieves sustainable increases 
in the economic, social and environmental benefits from forests and tress by all the people of 
Tanzania, especially the poor and vulnerable”. To ensure efficiency in forest management and 
conservation either for production and/or protection, the policy statements recognize the need for 
broad-stakeholders engagement though it does not define PFM as such. Under the forestry 
policy, engagement of local communities falls under two major options; through the 
establishment of Village Land Forest Reserves (VLFRs), where communities becomes managers 
and owners of forests within their village boundaries or through co-manager of forests under 
central and local government authorities-National Forest Reserves (NFRs) or Local Authority 
Forest Reserves (LAFRs). Additional important statements that the policy point out are those that 
address conservation of forest biodiversity, on watershed management and soil conservation and 
supply of trees seeds and planting stock. The policy further notes an increasing concern about the 
deteriorating state of forestry in the country. It acknowledges that the natural forest cover is 
receding; ecological services are declining; and that ere is increasing pressure on forest land 
and increasing demand on forest products. It further acknowledges that management capacity is 
limited and institutional weaknesses constrain development of the forest sector. In its guiding 
principles, the policy calls for diversity and environment services to safeguard the nation's forest 
biodiversity and environmental services through effective conservation strategies and calls for 
sustainable management of Tanzania’s forests. Beyond the formal forest reserve network, the 
policy considers the role of surrounding communities/village councils a rational way to rescue 
forest resources from unsustainable uses, however through clear legal mandates.  
 
7.0 Land Act (1999) and Village Land Act (1999) 
To provide for instruments to implement the National L nd Policy (1995), Tanzania enacted two 
land acts in 1999; the Land Act and the Village Land Act.  The two Acts have important 
implications on forest management in relation to land tenure, ownership and land use conflicts 
versus sustainable forest management as well as land use planning for forest development 
activities (URT, 2008). While the Village land Act (1999) provides for the management and 




administration of land in villages (as registered un er the Local Government Act No. 7 of 1982), 
and for related matters; the Land Act (1999) provide for the basic law in relation to land other 
than the village land, the management of land, settlement of disputes and related matters.  The 
provisions of both the Land Act (1999) and the Village Land Act (1999) and related regulations 
provided enabling environment for communities to participate in land management by 
recognizing and acknowledging existing customary rights practiced in by different ethnic groups 
in Tanzania (Village Land Act, 1999, Section 20: 97-98). Further, the Acts allows for registration 
of customary land rights to hold common resources on land such as forests by households, 
groups, or communities.  
 
8.0 Forest Act (2002) and Forest Regulations (2004) 
In accordance with the National Forestry Policy (1998), the Forest Act (2002) provides the legal 
framework to implement the National Forest Policy. Together with other objectives stipulated in 
the Act, the Forest Act (2002) aims to “encourage and facilitate the active participation of the 
citizen in the sustainable planning, management, use and conservation of forest resources 
through the development of individual and community rights, whether derived from customary 
law or under this Act, to use and manage forest resources;…to delegate responsibility for 
management of forest resources to the lowest possible level of local management consistent with 
the furtherance of national policies; …to promote coordination and cooperation between the 
forest sector and other agencies and bodies in the public and private sectors in respect of the 
management of the natural resources of Tanzania…”[Part II Section 3]. The legal bases under 
the forest act provide incentives for rural communities to participate in forest conservation. Such 
incentives include; waiving state royalties on forest produce and can, if they chose, retain 100% 
of revenue from sale of forest products (Forest ActSection 78 (3)), retaining fines levied on 
village land in respect of village land or community forest reserves as approved by village 
bylaws”, as well as the power to confiscate and sell any forest produce or equipment used to 
illegally harvest in a village land forest reserve (Forest Act, Section 97 (1)(b)).   
 
Furthermore, Forest Act (2002) classifies for four types of forests: First, National Forest 
Reserves (NFRs) managed by Central Government.  This type consists of; NFRs managed for 
protection, NFRs managed for production, Nature forst eserves, and Forests on general lands 
which are managed by central government. Second, the Local Authority Forest Reserves 
(LAFRs) managed by local government. These types consist; LAFRs (managed for protection 
and LAFRs managed for production) and forests on geeral lands managed by local 
governments. Third, the Village Forests which consist of; village land forest reserves (VLFRs); 
community forest reserves created out of village forests (CFRs), and forests which are not 
reserved which are on village land and of which the management is vested in the village council. 
The fourth type of forests are Private forests which includes; forests on village land held by one 
or more individuals under a customary right of occupancy, and forests on general or village land 
of which the rights of occupancy or a lease has been granted to a person or persons or a 
partnership or a corporate body or a Non-Governmental Organisation or any other body or 
organisation for the purpose of managing the forest which is required to be carried out in 
accordance with this Act. The enactment of the Forest Act (2002) was followed by passing of 
Forest Regulations (2004) which guided its operation.   




9.0 Participatory Forest Management Models  
The development of legal framework to support PFM has inverted the colonial approach of 
excluding local communities and other stakeholders from management of most land and 
associated resources. PFM has been adopted as an official strategy to allow for wide 
participation of stakeholders in forest resource management. PFM has three main policy 
objectives: improved forest quality, through sustainable management objectives; improved 
livelihoods through increased forest revenue and secure supply of subsistence forest products; 
and improved forest governance at district and village levels through effective and accountable 
resource management institutions (URT, 2003).  Theoretically, it is assumed that forests can be 
better managed under close involvement of forest users in decisions regarding appropriate 
management plans, rules and obligations pertaining to the resource (Pretty & Ward 2001, Ostrom 
1990; 1999). Two major forms/approach of PFM are being promoted in Tanzania; Joint Forest 
Management (JFM) and Community-Based Forest Management (CBFM) (URT, 2006). 
 
10.0 Joint Forest Management (JFM) 
Joint Forest Management (JFM) is recognized as a form f PFM approach that local 
communities become co-managers of forests on land that has been set aside (reserved land) by 
government as part of either Local Authority or National Forest Reserves (URT, 2007). The co-
management aspect can as well take place between th community and private forest owners 
(URT, 2002). The management aspect that is shared jointly includes the practical responsibilities 
of management and the authority to make decisions regarding the management aspects such as 
forest protection and regulations pertaining to costs and benefits from the resource (URT, 2007). 
The two parties involved in a joint management of forest e.g. the local community with Central 
Government (in National Forest Reserves) orwith District Government (in Local Authority 
Forest Reserves) or with private forest owners enter into agreements called Joint Forest 
Management Agreements (JFMAs). If a village signs a JFMA with either central or local 
government regarding the use and management of the forest, it (the village) should define an area 
“Village Forest Management Areas” within the forest that it will jointly manage with 
government as stipulate in the Forest Act, 2002 (Section 39 (2)). 
 
JFMAs is a legal document that spells out how the costs and benefits of forest management are 
shared between the forest owner (e.g. central governm nt or district government) and the 
managing partner (local community). Depending on the category of forest that is co-managed, 
the overall objectives may be for protection or production or a mixture of both (URT, 2007). In 
principle, JFMAs are required to be signed before a JFM programme is implemented, however 
experience show that most JFM programmes are being implemented in many parts of Tanzania 
before the respective JMAs become fully operational following their lengthy legal related 
aspects. 
 
11.0 Community-Based Forest Management (CBFM) 
Community-Based Forest Management (CBFM) is a form f PFM approach that takes place on 
village land, on forests that are owned or managed by the Village Council on behalf of the 
Village Assembly (URT, 2007).  It is under CBFM approach were villagers have legal rights to 
establish village forest reserves (Village Land Forest Reserves and Community Forest Reserves) 




as classified by the Forest Act (2002) or to establish Private Forest Reserves (URT, 2002; 2007). 
Different from JFM which takes place on National and Local Authority Forest Reserves, CBFM 
takes place inside village Lands (URT, 2007). Depending on the category of forest that is but 
under CBFM, the overall objectives may be for protection or production or a mixture of both 
(URT, 2007). The CBFM approach empowers the community to become both managers and 
forest owners. The communities elect village institutions to play the role of management and 
operations regarding production and/or protection of the forest. As per CBFM guidelines (URT, 
2007), the role of the district authority (to which the owner of the forest is located) is to support 
and assist the owner to manage the forests sustainably (URT, 2002; 2007). 
 
Under CBFM approach, a village land forest reserves (VLFR) is usually owned and managed by 
a single village within its village boundaries. In some areas where the forest covers more than 
one village, the Forest Act of 2002 (Section 32(3))  allows for a single VLFR to be owned and 
managed by more than one village even if respective villages are administratively under different 
local authority (URT, 2007). The overall management responsibility (if seems appropriate) is 
assumed by a “Joint Village Forest Management Committee (JVFMC)” comprising of members 
elected from each village council. Which is not clear y started and which has been a sources 
further degradation of the forest and trees, it the lack of clear management strategy of the village 
forest and trees which are not under CBFM. Thus, since the establishment of the CBFM went 
hand in hand with the marotarium of access to the for st, majority of the communities extended 
their forest needs into the nearby unprotected forest, hence leading to displacement effects. 
 
12.0 PFM Implementation and Coverage in Tanzania Mainland 
Implementation of Participatory Forest Management (both JFM and CBFM) was initiated as 
pilot activities. Early projects implemented in 1990s such as Duru-Haitemba forest in Babati 
District, Mgori Forest Reserve in Singida District and SULEDO forests under the SIDA-funded 
Land Management Programme (LAMP) provided important lessons for scaling up and for policy 
implication as they were implemented under a range of social and ecological conditions 
(Blomley and Ramadhani 2006; 2007). By 2008, most PFM programmes were supported by the 
government of Tanzania in collaboration with DANIDA and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Finland. Other players including the World Bank, through the Tanzania Forest Conservation and 
Management Project (TFCMP) and the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) provide support 
to community level (URT, 2008). In 2005, Tanzania minland was estimated to have 35.3 
million hectares of forests (FAO, 2009), which is currently estimated to be equivalent to 40% of 
the country’s area (FAO, 2010). 
 
13.0 JFM and CBFM Coverage 
As a result of implementation of PFM, the size of frest area managed by communities has 
grown considerably since the 1990s (Blomley and Ramadhani, 2007). By 2009, about 14.3 
million hectares of forests were within gazetted Forest Reserves either under National Forest 
Reserves, Local Authority Forest Reserves, Village Land Forest Reserves, Private and 
Community Forest Reserves for both production and protection purposes (URT, 2009). 
Additional 2.5 million hectares of forests were proosed Forest Reserves. Available data on PFM 
e.g. from end of 1990s indicates increase in adoption and spread of both CBFM and JFM across 




Tanzania. The total forest area under PFM has increased from 348,550 ha in 1999 to 4,122,500 
ha in 2008 with number of villages involved in PFM increasing from 555 to 2,328 respectively 
(URT, 2009).  
 
In 2012, MNRT undertook a detailed survey of PFM in the country. Data was collected from 80 
district councils and a range of projects and organizations involved in PFM implementation on 
the ground. Table 1 shows that PFM has spread in many p rts of the Mainland Tanzania. The 
table indicates that the total area of forest covered by PFM arrangement increased from 
4,122,500ha in 2008 to 7,758,788 ha by 2012. Thus an increase of about 50% for four years. 
 
Table 5: Overview of PFM on mainland Tanzania 
Total area of forest covered by PFM arrangements 7,758,788 hectares 
Percentage of total forest area under PFM 23.3% 
Number of villages involved in PFM 2,285 
Percentage of total villages in mainland Tanzania ivolved in PFM 21.5% 
Number of villages with declared/gazetted village forests or signed 
Joint Management Agreements 
580 
Number of districts where PFM is operational 77 
Source: URT 2012 
 
The coverage of PFM has continued to expand since its introduction in early 1990s. The number 
of participating villages has expanded over the past decade reflecting the continuing investments 
being made by the Government and Development Partners’ community alike. Table 2 shows the 
increasing number of forest area and villages covered by CBFM and JFM. 
 
Table 6: Overview of Forest Area and Villages covered with PFM (CBFM and JFM) in 
mainland Tanzania 
Year CBFM JFM Reference 
Forest area under 
CBFM (ha) 
No. of villages 
with CBFM 
Forest area 
under JFM (ha) 
No. of villages 
with JFM 
1999 323,220 544 25,330 11 Wily and Dewees, 2001 
2002 1,085,300 845 1,175,550 525 URT, 2001 
2006 2,060,600 1102 1,612,250 719 URT, 2006 
2008 2,345,500 1457 1,777,000 863 URT, 2008 
2012 2,366,693 1233 5,392,095 1052                          URT, 2012 
 
Table 2 shows that the area of forest under both CBFM and JFM has continued to increase. JFM 
now covers more forest area compared to CBFM; this is due to the fact that most of the reserved 
forests under JFM are of big sizes as compared with those under CBFM. From the URT 2012 
survey, CBFM now covers around 12.1% of unreserved forest land while JFM covers 
approximately 41% of forests within gazetted forest erves under central or local government. 
  
Furthermore Table 3 suggests that the number of participating villages with CBFM has 
decreased since the 2008 survey. It is to be noted that this decrease does not mean a decline in 
investment but rather is the correction made from the previous survey where there were double 




counting of the villages where forest reserve was managed by more than one village (URT, 
2012). 
 
Table 7: Overview of CBFM and JFM coverage in Mainland Tanzania 
Community-Based Forest Management (percentages) Joint Forest Management (Percentages) 
Number of declared Village Land Forest 
Reserves 
409 Number of villages that have signed JMAs 171 
Number of Gazetted Village Land Forest 
Reserves 
71 Number of National Forest Reserves with 
JFM 
181 
Number of District where CBFM is 
implemented 
69 Number of Local Authority Forest Reserves 
with JFM 
101 
Percent of public land forests under CBFM 
arrangements 
12.1 Percent of total area reserved by National or 
Local Government under some form of JMA 
41 
Percent of Villages on Mainland Tanzania that 
are engaged in CBFM activities 
11.7   
Source: URT 2012  
 
In addition to data presented in Table 3, by 2012 the number of declared Village Land Forest 
Reserves (VLFRs) under CBFM had reached 509 in 69 districts, with a total of 71 gazette 
VLFRs mostly in Iringa Region. Of 1052 villages where JFM activities are implemented, only 
171 villages have signed the Joint Management Agreements (JMA), approximately 17%.  
 
With regards to the type of forests covered by the diff rent models of PFM, CBFM appears to 
have covered mostly miombo woodlands, coastal and acaci  woodlands where majority of 
unreserved forests can be found making them suitable for management by village governments. 
On the other hand, JFM arrangements cover mostly the montane catchment forests in the high 
biodiversity Eastern Arc forests and Mangrove forests along coastal Tanzania, which were 
already reserved by central or local governments. The JFM initiative has been strengthened by 
national and international NGOs promoting forest conservation such as Tanzania Forest 
Conservation Group, Wildlife Conservation Society of Tanzania, WWF and CARE International.  
 
Analysis done in 2008, indicated CBFM to have covered mostly miombo woodlands, coastal and 
acacia woodlands where majority of unreserved forests can be found. On the other hand, JFM 
arrangements cover mostly the montane evergreen forsts and mangroves, which were already 
reserved by central or local governments (URT, 2008) as illustrated in Figure 2. 
 





Figure 2: Coverage of CNFM and JFM in different Forest Types [Source: URT 2008] 
URT (2012) documents reduced levels of disturbance from illegal harvesting for charcoal and 
timber from forests placed under community management compared to forests on the general 
land and under government management without community involvement. This is evidenced 
from the regular monitoring reports by FBD and PMO-RALG (Prime minister’s Office-Regional 
Administration and Local Government) Officials. The major reason for this is the fact that 
majority of the PFM had undergone moratorium to allw the forest to recover without giving the 
adjacent community alternatives to their NTFP needs. Thus, adjacent communities displaced 
their forest products needs to the nearby unprotected forest. The initial expectation was that with 
the moratorium in the forest, the adjacent community could plant their own tree on their own 
farm to cater for their household needs of fuel wood, thus leading to replacement effects of PFM, 
however, given the fact that it takes time for the ree to grow to the harvest level the immediate 
effects was displacement, whereby the community extended their efforts into the nearby non-
PFM forest. Furthermore, following improved forest management, farmers with fields bordering 
the forest complain of crop raiding caused by increased wild animals. 
 
There has been growing dissatisfaction expressed from participating communities regarding JFM 
(Robinson and Lokina, 2011). This is because a final decision regarding the sharing of benefits 
from JFM has yet to be reached. Without a clear and bi ing agreement on how forest benefits 
and revenues will be shared between communities and the government, many agreements remain 
unsigned explaining why only a small number of JMA have been signed (TNRF, 2012).  
 
The efforts to solve this problem have started under Tanzania Forest Services Agency by 
reviewing the formally proposed costs and benefits sharing rates and mechanism for ploughing 
back communities’ shares taking into consideration how communities living near to high 
biodiversity catchment forests and nature reserves will be motivated as in such forest harvesting 
and utilization are restricted (URT, 2012). 
 




Communities in areas implementing both Community-Based Forest Management and Joint 
Forest Management remain to be the central point for successful implementation of PFM 
activities. At the government level, PFM activities are spearheaded by the Ministry responsible 
for forest resource administration (i.e. the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism through 
Tanzania Forest Service). In addition, PFM activities have gained support from a range of other 
actors including the local government, local NGOs, international NGOs and through bilateral 
agreements.  
 
14.0 Costs-Benefits sharing mechanism   
As described earlier, cost-benefit sharing arrangements differ significantly between CBFM and 
JFM model. Villages are provided with legal rights and incentives to own and manage forest 
resources on village land in ways that are both sustainable and profitable (The Local Government 
Act No.7 of 1982, Village Land Act No. 5 of 1999 and the Forest Act No. 14 of 2002) Under the 
Forest Act (2002), among other things; communities have legal rights to benefit from waiving 
state royalties on forest produce (Ostrom, 1999, Pretty and Ward 200), retaining 100% of 
revenue from sale of forest products, levying and retaining fines, and confiscation of forest 
produce and equipment from illegal harvesting. In a study to examine the impacts of PFM 
(CBFM) to local forest-based livelihood in the biodiversity hotspots of the Eastern Arc 
Mountains of Tanzania, findings demonstrated a minial contribution of CBFM to poverty 
reduction when combined with support for forest-linked income generating activities (Meshack, 
2005; Robinson and Lokina, 2011; Lokina, 2012). On the other hand, the study identified 
negative impacts to the community related to CBFM establishment, including; reduced access to 
forest products and services, prohibited access to forested land, increased crop damage by wild 
animals or crop pests, and loss of income by traditional honey collectors and hunters.  
 
In high biodiversity areas where JFM is heavily promoted, management costs incurred by 
communities living around protected areas are higher than the benefits obtained from supporting 
JFM in their area. While forest put under JFM for water catchment purpose used for irrigation, 
industrial activities, domestic purpose etc. by downstream users, no tangible benefits is returned 
to compensate conservation efforts at the local level. Under JFM, villages are recognized as co-
managers but there is currently no clear and functio al guidance on cost-benefits sharing 
mechanism between the managing partners. Modalities of determining cost-benefit sharing for 
JFM in Protection (Catchment) Forest Reserves and Pro uction (Natural) Forest Reserves are 
different. In National or Local Authority Protection forests utilization of timber and non-timber 
products by communities is not permitted but negotiations can be made to allow ‘‘limited and 
localized’’ utilization such as of water, honey, firewood, medicinal plants. In some cases were 
local communities are permitted to harvest timber tr e, limited timber is allowed for social 
development activities such as construction of village infrastructure (e.g. schools and clinics). In 
Production forests where production is permitted, a sh re can be channelled to the communities 
following a harvest of forest resources (URT, 2007).  
 
Number of studies has been done to assess three policy objectives of PFM (improved forest 
quality, livelihood and governance) (see for example; TAFORI, 2009; Robinson and Lokina, 
2011; Lokina, 2012. Results of different researches done attempted to answer the question on 




whether PFM is the right option for sustainable forest management in Tanzania. Benefits arising 
from PFM in line with its policy objectives vary greatly from site to site and depend on PFM 
model (either CBFM or JFM) adopted.  
 
15.0 Improved Forest quality 
Mixed results are available to support the evidence that PFM approach results into improved 
forest conditions. Overall results indicate that; in most areas JFM has been influential in 
restoring and sustaining forest conditions and in reducing forest degradation as compared to 
forests managed by the government alone or under open access regime (Pfliegner, 2007; URT, 
2009).  Indicators used to justify improvement in forest condition includes: increases in basal 
area and volume, declines in number of stems per ha in forests managed under CBFM, and 
increases in JFM areas and forests under exclusive stat  management.  
 
A comparative study of three matched pairs of similar forests under JFM and state management 
showed forests under JFM to be in better conditions than those without JFM, (Pfliegner and 
Moshi 2007; Robinson and Lokina, 2011). Better forest conditions included: higher numbers of 
live and naturally dead trees, poles, or withies, and fewer cut timber trees, 68% fewer freshly cut 
timber trees than 70% less frequent in the JFM than in forest without co-management. In 
addition, almost 34% more live timber trees, 45% more live poles, and more than 55% more 
withies were recorded in JFM areas, and lower incidences of freshly cut poles and withies 
(TAFORI, 2009). 
 
Table 8: Households’ Opinion about the success of PFM 
 JFM  (n=646) CBFM  (n=206) 
 Frequency % Frequency % 
Successful 537 83.2 154 74.8 
Not at all successful 55 8.52 25 12.1 
Don’t know 51 7.89 26 12.62 
Too early to tell 3 0.46 1 0.49 
 
Source: Lokina and Banga 2010 
 
16.0 Improved Livelihood 
The benefits of PFM implementation on livelihood of the community can better be assessed by 
considering livelihood assets as defined by Ellis (2000) to include human, natural, social, 
financial and physical assets as well as activities and access to these components. In the same 
way as improvement in forest conditions vary from site to site depending largely on the PFM 
model adopted, the contribution of PFM to improved livelihoods and incomes at both community 
and household levels takes the same route as indicate  by various studies/projects.  
 
 Promotion of alternative livelihood activities (see for example Ostrom 1999; Hanley et al., 
1997) such as fish farming, butterfly rearing, rearing of small livestock, beekeeping, on-farm tree 
planting, agroforestry and eco-tourism has been a concern in JFM forests especially those under 
National Forest Reserves. Such alternative livelihood activities contribute to improved household 
income. A study by Nshubemuki (2009) on contribution f agroforestry practice involving 




planting trees suitable for firewood, timber and char oal communities surrounding the Ruvu 
North Forest Reserve (under JFM) indicated that; each participating household in four villages 
(Kongowe, Mwendapole, Msangani and Mkuza) earned a total of TZS 310,329 in 2007 from 
selling charcoal, firewood, poles, agricultural crops and tree seedlings from JFM plots. This 
income contributed significantly in improving household income. Butterfly farming is among 
best practices to improve income of participating communities in Eastern Usambara Mountains 
(Nshubemuki, 2009). 
 
In another initiative, the Mpingo Conservation and Development Initiative (MCDI) facilitated 
the first commercial harvest of Mpingo (the East African Blackwood, Dalbergia melanoxylon) in 
a certified VLFR managed by Kikole village, in Kilwa District. Upon completion of harvest in 
November 2009, the village obtained revenue of US$1,800 in return of 15 cubic metres of D.
melanoxylon (TNRF, 2012). The money was used by the village to pay for forest patrols and 
other management activities, as well as to complete a n w house for the village midwife in the 
village. Prior to approval of the management plan for the establishment of VLFR in Kikole, the 
village has received previously around 4% per sell of each log for 63 logs sold. In JFM forests 
were harvesting is not allowed; participating villages have the right to retain fines collected from 
local patrols of illegal activities happening in the forest (see for example Robinson and Lokina, 
2010).  
 
17.0 Improved governance 
The objective of PFM to improve forest governance se ms to vary depending on the nature of the 
community involved and the PFM approach undertaken. Generally, most PFM seems to focus on 
the process to get the PFM in place while issues of governance appear to be cross cutting through 
participation, transparency, accountability, and rule of law. PFM build upon existing government 
structure at the community level. In PFM, the practical responsibility to manage the forest is 
exercised through village institutions elected by all community members, and the authority to 
make decisions regarding forest management is vested in village institutions (URT, 2007). As 
per requirement by the Forest Act, 2002, the village must elect a committee-usually called a 
Village Natural Resource Committee (VNRC) or Village Environment Committee-to manage 
their forest on their behalf. VNRC is a sub-committee of Village Council and is (as a must) 
selected by the Village Assembly and not appointed by the Village Council and is the principal 
body concerned with the management of the Village Land Forest Reserve (for CBFM) or a 
Village Forest Management Areas (for JFM). In CBFM, where more than one village shares a 
forest, participating villages select a Joint Village Forest Management Committee. It is upon 
existing institutions in the village, with facilitation from the government that aspects of improved 
governance can be assessed and compared between forsts under CBFM and JFM.  
 
18.0 Opportunities to Forest Conservation 
Implementation of PFM activities has for the moment not exhausted all opportunities attached to 
forest management. In addition to cost-benefit arrangements advocated and stipulated in different 
policies, opportunities of extracting the most from forest resources under PFM through sales of 
carbon credits through implementation of international policy to reduce emission from 




deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) and through community forest certification 
schemes do exist.  
 
19.0 REDD+ Initiatives 
Climate change has been recognized as a global challenge that can be addressed through both 
national and international efforts. Among efforts to address the problem is to reduce emissions of 
Green House Gases (GHGs) regarded as major contributor of global warming and hence climate 
change. Efforts to reduce emission of GHGs are sector specific, and depend on available 
systems, infrastructure and capacity to enable the process. In the forest sector, a policy to reduce 
emissions resulting from deforestation and forest degradation in forest rich countries has been 
conceived not only to reduce GHGs emission but to provide financial incentives to forest owners 
through sales of carbon credits (through offsets and sequestration).  Despite the potential 
financial incentives associated with the implementation of REDD+ activities in Tanzania,  it is 
still at pilot stages. From the support of the government of Norway, Tanzania (in 2008) started 
implementation of pilot activities through Non-governmental Organizations distributed in 
different parts of the country. As sales of carbon credits are not expected in the near future, 
communities are expected to benefit from activities promoted to reduce drivers of deforestation 
and forest degradation.  
 
Several challenges are foreseen regarding implementatio  of REDD+ activities. At the 
international level, modalities to finance REDD+ activities have not yet been finalized. At the 
national level, among other things REDD+ activities have to demonstrate real offsets, address 
leakage, prove additionality, permanence, as well as develop an effective measurement, reporting 
and verification system (MRV system). Furthermore, a fair and transparent and workable cost-
benefit sharing mechanism has to be developed.  
 
Revenues from sales of carbon credits under REDD+ activities are not expected in the near 
future, and probably not within the next five to ten years. Communities are expected to benefit 
from alternative income generating activities, and from activities to address drivers of 
deforestation and forest degradation stipulated in the action plan for implementation of the 
National REDD+ Strategy. Currently, REDD+ Pilot projects in Kilosa and Kilwa; are working to 
design the best approach for distribution of revenues from sales of carbon credits at the 
community level. Individual payments done to community members are important source of 
income at the household level, while payments directed to support community projects are 
important for the development of the whole community. Modalities of payments in each pilot 
village are community-driven and differ according to agreed bases.   
 
20.0 Forest Certification Schemes 
Forest certification is defined as “a system to give recognition to those forest managers who 
follow international standards and best practices of responsible management and fair treatment of 
local people”. Most certified big companies who have the capacity necessary to meet the 
demanding standards manage forests around the world. However, community managed forests 
can also be certified. The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) runs the best-known forest 




certification scheme in the world. This scheme is al o widely recognized as the best and 
toughest; it is the global gold standard in responsible forest management. 
 
Several companies in Tanzania have pursued FSC certification for plantation forests, most 
notably Green Resources Limited and Tanganyika Wattle Company. The Mpingo Conservation 
and Development Initiative (MCDI) is the first organization in Tanzania to obtain an FSC 
certificate for community-managed forests, and hold the only such certificate in the whole of 
Africa. MCDI is working in Kilwa District, South-Eastern Tanzania to help and encourage the 
community to engage in Participatory Forest Management (PFM) by setting Village Land Forest 
Reserve (VLFR) in their area. This arrangement is considered beneficial as in VLFR the 
community will own the rights to forest resources within the reserve. More recently, MCDI has 
been working to combined certification scheme and REDD+ to catalyze expansion of PFM into 
new villages across the miombo woodlands of southeas ern Tanzania. Establishment of more 
PFM is in turn expected to accrue revenues from REDD+ payments, which in turn will lead to 
more PFM and more revenue to communities from selling FSC certified mpingo.  
 
21.0 Discussion and Conclusion  
The key issues that clearly emerged from this review and which can guarantee sustainability of 
PFM is the question of cost-benefit sharing mechanism.  Implementation of cost-benefit sharing 
mechanism between the government (owner) and the local communities (co-managers) in JFM 
forests set for production have not yet been clear. This legal gap has been mentioned as another 
reasons leading to delay in signing JFMA (Bromley and Ramadhani, 2007; URT, 2009). In 
production forest, the government collects significant revenues from harvesting of timber, 
charcoal and firewood by commercial timber operators. Moreover, direct benefits arising from 
protection of forest such as water catchment forest and high biodiversity forests have not been 
realized by local communities and hence hinder active participation. The government through the 
Ministry of Natural Resource and Tourism proposed to undertake revision of benefit revenue 
sharing mechanisms; however the process has not been finalized and no standard cost-benefit 
ratios have been agreed (URT 2012).  Initiatives such as   Payments for Environmental Services 
(PES) and REDD+ in high biodiversity and catchment forests are recommended to enhance the 
flow of benefits to the local community (URT, 2008). The challenge remains on how to do 
appropriate monitoring of PES/REDD+ to ensure that local communities gain significant 
benefits.  
 
 Despite positive willingness of some community to participate in PFM implementation, poverty 
among the community remains a central constraint prohibiting effective participation. To address 
poverty, PFM implementers need to view PFM in a broader scale by considering the community 
and comprehensiveness of the environment. Existing policies and legal set-up provides strong 
incentives for local participation in Community-based Forest Management (CBFM). In some 
areas with rich forest resources CBFM has the potential to generate significant and widespread 
economic benefits to the communities involved through their legal rights to consumptive use of 
forest resources in line with approved management plan. However, translating this opportunity 
into a reality has never been the case in most areas due to a range of reasons including (according 
to URT, 2009); Institutional failures and governance shortfalls in the forest sector, limited 




capacity (human, operational resources and legal understanding) at local government level, lack 
of knowledge among forest-dependent communities on CBFM opportunities, concerns over loss 
of forest revenues to District Councils, focus on conservation and protection rather than 
sustainable utilization. 
 
Furthermore, effective governance and enforcement is important for attaining PFM objectives of 
improved forest quality, improved livelihoods, and improved forest governance despite the 
presence of a well-described CBFM or JFM structure. Community members are willing to 
participate in PFM activities if awareness-raising campaigns are put at the forefront of 
operations, at early stages of PFM. Awareness raising campaigns and appropriate legal 
environment creates enabling environment for adoption of PFM programmes in villages. This 
goes hand in hand with involvement of local communities in various stages of PFM in order to 
win their (community) confidence and create a sense of ownership, and hence sufficient time and 
efforts are required.  
 
Lack of landscape or ecosystem level approach to imple ent PFM activities has been leading to 
displacement (leakage) of degradation of forests in areas not covered by PFM.  Thus, another 
key issue is on addressing leakage by implementing PFM within a landscape approach: A 
landscape approach or an ecological level approach undertakes PFM at a wide scope by taking 
into account nearby forests. This approach is more preferred than the current forest-by-forest or 
village-by-village basis as it takes into account displacement of prohibited activities into 
neighboring less protected forests. For a practical JFM, Lokina and Robinson (2008) recommend 
a need for a CBFM in areas where JFM operates in order for villagers to collect forest resources 
under managed conditions. 
 
JFM poses additional challenges in that it requires the equitable sharing of both costs and 
benefits if it is to work effectively. Most JFM agreements negotiated to date have taken place in 
so called “protected forest” (typically high biodiversity, montane catchment forests) that have 
few legal benefits as the forest is strictly conserved. Consequently the issue of revenue sharing 
does not arise (and many have argued, is resulting in questionable agreements) (Blomley, 2006). 
To many, this is viewed as government is trying to shed its duty to the local community without 
compensating for their time and resources. However, in “production forests” where harvesting 
takes place (both natural forest and plantations), as this review has shown, significant revenue is 
created from the use of timber, charcoal and firewood by commercial timber operators. This is 
the major source of revenue for FBD and much of it is retained for operational costs at the 
ministerial level and field levels. Under such circumstances, resistance from some quarters 
within central government to share revenues in JFM agreements is evident and consequently no 
standardized JFM cost-benefit sharing ratios have been agreed and promulgated nationally. 
 
The benefits of participating in the PFM are not always assured. In some cases, especially JFM, 
PFM is being implemented on the basis of perceived, rather than assured, expectations. For 
example, even where basic infrastructure does not exis , communities are encouraged to promote 
ecotourism as an income generating activity. In many cases this is an unrealistic expectation. In 




some JFM operations, communities believe that they will eventually be allocated ownership 
rights over state forests. This is very unlikely to happen in the immediate future.  
 
What is emerging from the review is that PFM have succeeded in restoring or maintaining forest 
quality under both CBFM and JFM arrangements. Encroachment has decreased, unregulated 
activities such as charcoal burning and timber harvesting decline and game numbers increase. 
However, it is clear that communities have yet to fully capture the potential social and economic 
benefits of local forest management and as such the contribution of PFM to poverty reduction 
remains limited, despite a clear commitment from the government to do so. The revenues 
generated by villages from sustainable forest management are still relatively low, given the high 
value and large areas of forest resources under village control. And this is where the big 
challenges lies with PFM, on their sustainability. The only important sources of revenue to 
villagers are fines and levies, by the village council on those found conducting illegal activities, 
which will definitely decline as enforcement under PFM increases. Furthermore, it is evident that 
neighboring forests, which are not under any PFM arrangement, are threatened by over-
utilization and extinction. This is more for those bordering the JFM forest, which has a very 
limited direct use. Thus, to protect non-PFM forest from further degradation and even extinction, 
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